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Government corporations have been and continue to be 
created to perform various 'business-like' functions within 
the public sector. While public corporate structures date 
back to the turn of the century, they made their real po­
litical debut during the 1930's as 'stabilization corpo­
rations*. Since that time, use of the corporate concept in 
government has ebbed and flowed, experiencing significant 
growth through the last two decades. However, as govern­
ment corporations have multiplied in recent years so have 
the problems surrounding this form of organization.
According to Harold Seidman, "Misgivings are being 
expressed,...not only about the failure to develop effective 
systems to assure public accountability, but by the tendency 
to misuse the enterprise solely as a device to keep expendi­
tures out of the budget and escape controls."^ Seidman 
argues that rather than correcting "deficiencies" in core 
government agencies. Congress creates more governmental 
institutions in pursuit of political effectiveness, and 
thereby, jeopardizes the integrity of the corporate form.
The U. S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) is an 
example of a public enterprise created hastily and in 
time of crisis. For a host of reasons, it is also an
example of a well intentioned program that not only hasn't 
lived up to its potential, but was perhaps, doomed from the 
start. In creating the SFC, Congress believed that flex­
ibility was critical to the successful launching of the 
synfuels program and therefore, deliberately exempted the 
new Corporation from adherence to numerous executive 
branch managerial laws. Despite exempting the Corporation 
from most forms of presidential power. Congress created 
provisions for 21 separate legislative vetos. Therefore, 
the SFC appears to be highly autonomous at the executive 
branch level, but actually may be one of the most tightly 
controlled corporations in recent memory.
What is unfortunate about this phenomenon, is that 
Congress, in setting itself up as the primary overseer, also 
made the SFC uniquely vulnerable to a host of political 
pressures. These pressures, in turn, created a terrific game 
of political football over the last four to five years which 
has exacted a heavy toll on the SFC. The organization con­
tinues to lose professional staff through attrition and 
several departments within the Corporation have totally dis­
appeared, A few projects will have been funded, but the 
production levels resulting will be nowhere near the levels 
originally proposed by Congress in mid-1980. Congressional 
observers predict, in fact, that if currently pending legis­
lation is successfully enacted, the Corporation could com­
pletely close its doors to further project solicitations
2by as early as the spring/summer of 1986,
The intent of this paper is to provide a descriptive 
case study of the controversy which has engulfed the SFC 
during its brief existence. In particular, we will examine 
the impact of the following areas on the performance of the 
SFC: (1) political and economic influences; (2) managerial
and organizational weaknesses; (3) staffing and personnel 
problems; (4) poor enabling legislation; (5) questions of 
autonomy versus oversight; and (6) Congressional liaisons. 
Before turning to this case study, however, we will examine 
the history of and perennial issues surrounding public 
corporations.
CHAPTER ONE: FOOTNOTES
^Harold Seidman, "Public Enterprises in the USA," 
Annals of Public and Co-operative Economy I (March 1983):16.
2Gary Knight, Former Congressional Affairs Director 
of U. S. House Relations, U. S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, 




Increasingly, modern government may be faced with a 
new dilemma. Citizens of western democracies continually 
demand more services from the public sector, while simul­
taneously distrust of government and the bureaucracy has 
grown. In recent decades, there has been a search for 
alternative structures that will efficiently deliver 
services within the public sector while surpassing the 
tight controls of traditional government bureaucracies.
In reaction to this situation, Ira Sharkansky 
observes that modern states are both growing and withering 
at the same time. "They grow in response to incessant 
demands for more services; they wither as officials 
assign important activities to bodies that enjoy formal 
grants of autonomy from the state. Enter public enterprise."
It is true that every nation has a different approach 
regarding public enterprises. In contrast to the U.S., 
many countries operate most of their basic services through 
publicly financed enterprises. These enterprises may be 
core agencies of the central government or they may be 
quite autonomous. Currently, the trend tends to be falling
6
into the latter category. Australia is at this enu of
the spectrum with a relatively small central, or core,
government and numerous autonomous, publicly financed
2government corporations. Conversely, the central govern­
ment of the U.S. has historically provided few basic 
services and where they have been provided, it has gener­
ally been by core agencies. Although the number of federal 
government corporations has almost doubled since 1960, 
their number and personnel remain small by comparison with 
the rest of the federal government.
While the Federal government has been slow about 
using the corporate form of organization, the states and 
localities have not. Regional, state, county, and city 
governments have used such "authorities" to finance, 
construct, or operate revenue-producing enterprises.
The Institute of Public Administration (IPA) estimates 
that in the late 1970's there were at least 6,000 local 
and regional authorities and 1,000 state and interstate 
corporations operating, a number that had increased to 
almost 10,000 by 1981. The number of federal corpora­
tions was extimated then to be 35 by IPA. However, 
sources disagree on the actual amount at the federal 
level today. In 1983, the GAO cited 47 (See Appendix I), 
while recently the United States House Government Oper­
ations Committee defines only 4 3 such organizations as 
corporations.  ̂ It is clearly an issue of what criteria
are used to determine their existence.
At the federal level, the continued increase of 
"contracting-out" for services, as well as the growth in 
public enterprise, has tended to blur the line between 
public and private sectors. In recent years, there has 
been a gradual dispersion of public functions away from 
core government agencies toward independent agencies, quasi- 
government organizations, government corporations, and 
private corporations. Whether or not this dispersion is 
offering greater performance and efficiency is debatable. 
The issue of significance here is that decision-making in 
many areas is shifting from politically accountable core 
agencies and executives toward somewhat unaccountable 
entities, or to what Ron Moe of the Congressional Research
4Service calls "the margin of government".
According to Moe, "There is a lot of government on 
the margin that is functioning largely unexamined by 
political scientists. Moe argues that since decisions 
affecting public monies are increasingly made through 
organizations not "effectively" accountable to either the 
President or Congress, the current approach to political 
science and/or public administration study is outdated. 
"There remains an underlying assumption in American 
political science literature that nearly all administra­
tive policy and program implementation is conducted by 
regular agencies of the government that are accountable 
to the President and through him to the Congress.
8
The congressional objective for establishing 
federal government corporations has been to create an 
environment where seemingly business-type programs will 
demand a high degree of automony and flexibility from 
the traditionally rigid federal regulations found in 
core agency organization. Within this framework, federal 
corporations are often exempt from civil service pay 
scales and hiring practices, position ceilings, and 
statutes governing procurement regulations. Specific 
enabling legislation for a given corporation may be 
designed so that authorizations are 'off-budget': the
budget process simply being reviewed by Congress annually 
rather than requiring a formal submission through 0MB as 
is mandated for all Executive Branch agencies.
Further, the public corporation is often created 
with the attitude that .no other organizational form would 
be sufficient. Often in reaction to politically acute 
situations. Congress establishes these usually single 
purpose mechanisms to simplify an immediate and complex 
government problem. The potential advantages for use of 
such a mechanism may be easy to enumerate, especially in 
this era of "less government" sentiment: 1) insulation
from political influence, 2) managerial and budgetary 
flexibility, 3) speed and efficiency, 4) increased access 
to bond markets, 5) protected, earmarked funding for 
priority projects and long term debt service, 6)business­
like and self supporting management, and 7) use of a
mixed-ownership corporation, having the potential for 
transfer to the private sector.*^
However, the disadvantages of using such organiza­
tions as public problem solvers are less obvious, leaving 
these corporations open to individual scrutiny, or at 
best, questioning the logic of why this form of organiza­
tion was utilized at all. None of the advantages listed 
above are automatically achieved by use of the public 
corporation. As recent history has proven, the record of 
public corporations at all levels of U.S. Government in­
cludes examples of political corruption, mismanagement, 
financial debacle, and construction and operating failures. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the corporate form has 
sometimes been chosen by the political sector as a 'cure- 
all ' mechanism, thrown into a precarious commercial arena 
with unrealistic and immediate expectations, i.e. the U.S. 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation (USSFC). Although, there are 
numerous success stories which more than justify the use 
of the corporate form for solving public problems, there 
are certainly examples of politically ill-conceived 
corporate structures that may have achieved the desired 
objectives more efficiently through alternate public or 
private structures. Significantly, it may often be due 
to this inappropriate political choice of where real or 
perceived unaccountability multiplies and is followed by 
political disaster.
10
Moreover, wide variation exists in the legal, 
financial, structural and policy parameters of public 
corporations. This issue alone has prompted concerns among 
critics and scholars for some time regarding the improper 
use of the corporate concept. It is often contended that 
the word 'corporate' is being used to assign special 
privileges, real or presumed, to what otherwise would be 
core agencies that have no commercial function and produce 
no revenue. In other words, the corporate concept can 
easily be abused, or suffer from perception of abuse, 
especially in Washington's highly visible, national polit­
ical environment. Daily interaction with the forces of 
public decision-making will ultimately unveil any attempts 
to avoid accountability to Executive Branch management 
agencies. Compounding this persuasive, pragmatic argument 
is the intellectual debate from academia that has yet to 
resolve an accepted doctrine guiding the structure and 
activities of corporations. In fact, defining the govern­
ment corporation may currently be an impossible task, for 
as we shall see, numerous corporations have at their in­
ception been defined differently varying with the political 
era in which they were created, the purposes, the industry, 
the commercial environment, and the creators themselves.
Historical Background
First Part of the 20th Century 
The corporate form is often believed to be a creation 
of the industrial revolution. However, corporate bodies 
as legal entities are cited as far back as 205 A.D. under
QRoman law. Under the mercantilist political doctrines 
of the nineteenth century, public corporations were recog­
nized in the U.S. for their abilities in performing 
certain functions. Although, these functions were largely 
limited then to "internal improvements", i.e. turnpikes, 
canals, and local utilities, in 1846, Congress set up the 
Smithsonian Institution as a corporate entity for adminis­
tering the bequest of James Smithson. This was the pre­
decessor of other establishments - the National Academy 
of Sciences, the National Home for Disabled Volunteer 
Soldiers, and the National Training Schools for Boys and 
Girls - of a charitable or cultural nature conducted in 
corporate form as adjuncts of the federal government.
Government-owned enterprises, like many elements of 
American government, have complex historical roots that 
have shaped their growth and common opinions toward them. 
According to Annmarie Walsh in The Public's Business,
"These roots are the mixed heritage of libertarian
12
economic theory, moralistic attitudes toward public debt,... 
the pragmatic experiments of the New Deal, and reaction 
against the expansion of government activities that 
followed.
It is true, though, that the federal government made 
little use of this structure of organization until compara­
tively recent times. In 1904, the U.S. acquired the Panama 
Railroad Company when the assets of the French New Panama 
Canal Company were purchased. The Railroad was subsequently 
operated as an adjunct of the Panama Canal, but it was not 
until World War I that the first wholly-owned government 
corporations were created. To accomplish its wartime ob­
jectives, the government found it necessary to construct 
and operate a merchant fleet, to build, rent, and sell 
houses, to buy and sell sugar and grain, to lend money, 
and to engage in other commercial enterprises. An example 
is the U.S. Grain Corporation,^^ established to perform 
emergency functions. However, it was typical of the 
period, politically, that these bodies were very shortlived, 
and thus, their policies and structures were never questioned 
before liquidation began.
During the 1930's, a number of corporations were 
formed to help the starved, domestic economy. Collectively, 
these bodies have been referred to as the stabilization 
corporations; many of them being limited to the agricultural 
field, where they were viewed simply as temporary supple­
ments to their private sector equivalents. The purpose of
13
these agriculturally oriented corporations was to permit 
greater liquidity and longer-term commitments in commodity 
markets, and to make distress loans to farmers. The New 
Deal also created corporations that made distress loans to 
homeowners, banks, insurance companies, and railroads. 
President Hoover had established the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC) which financed many of the public enter­
prises during the depression. The RFC was a federal cor­
poration engaged in investment banking. Ultimately, "it 
provided $1.5 billion in loans for government-owned, 
revenue-producing projects, many of them undertaken by 
wholly-owned state and local government corporations 
specially created to take advantage of RFC financing.
Perhaps due to their political success in desperate 
economic times, such organizations were easily institution­
alized, i.e., the Commodity Credit Corporation, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, and of course, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
all still exist today. Moreover, as these organizations 
were created, procedures for controlling them developed 
only through piecemeal administrative action. Therefore, 
critics often attacked the apparent lack of accountability 
during this period.
However, popularity for the government corporation 
concept ebbed and flowed between the World Wars. Signi­
ficantly, it was the proponents of the Scientific Manage­
ment movement who showed enthusiasm for the concept because 
it tended to enhance the role of professional public
14
administrators, and diminish direct accountability to
political leaders. According to Moe, "One legacy of the
Scientific Management movement during the early decades
of this century was the belief that the corporate form of
organization run by a professionally trained manager was
superior to a regular agency run by a politically account-
12able executive." It is clear that elements of this 
attitude continually surface in Washington.
During this period, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) was the promising prototype to emulate. TVA repre­
sented agency autonomy with efficiency; it was "a sign in 
the sky, an indication of things to come."^^ David Lilienthal, 
Chairman of the Board of the TVA, envisioned the decision­
making process used by the agency as "grass roots 
14democracy." According to Lilienthal,
"Congress in 193S took advantage of the opportunity 
that its selection of the independent corporate 
device created, and freed the TVA of the conventional 
procedures of government agencies and bureaus. The 
TVA continues in this autonomous status; it is not 
part of any of the existing bureaus and departments, 
and the head of the TVA reports directly to the 
President and to Congress......Suppose these princi­
ples of management and decentralization, which 
Congress made it possible for TVA to put into effect 
in this valley, should be extended throughout the 
government. Would it mean the virtug^ abolition of the 
historic departments in Washington?"
Indeed, it appears that TVA's unprecedented autonomy 
was the subject of much debate, especially from those 
concerned with the challenge to the President's management 
authority represented by the corporation. Lilienthal's 
somewhat populist's views toward the largely autonomous
15
government corporation were countered by those political 
scientists who supported the government corporation con­
cept, but who also wanted these corporations to be 
politically accountable in a direct manner to the President 
and his appointed officials. Traditional theories of 
administrative organization were antagonistic to the 
existence of autonomous administrative entities, and 
markedly biased in favor of a closely coordinated execu­
tive branch. Although, TVA simply fueled Roosevelt's 
political confidence, "a corporation clothed with the 
power of government, but possessed of the initiative and 
flexibility of a private e n t e r p r i s e H o w e v e r ,  the 
debate finally culminated in 1937 with the release of the 
Brownlow Committee Report which primarily advocated the 
"integrationist" position that by 1939 placed most cor­
porations under a supervisory agency, other than TVA and 
the FDIC. The Report has all the appearances of being a 
political compromise.
By 194 0, almost all the corporations had been 
"integrated" into the departmental structure, although 
there remained considerable diversity among financial 
matters. Meanwhile, the national build-up for World War 
II provided incentive for creating a new set of corporations 
The RFC created subsidiaries that engaged in petroleum, 
metals, rubber, and other defense supply production and 
distribution." By 1945, there were sixty-three wholly- 
owned and thirty-eight partly owned federal corporations,
16
plus nineteen noncorporate credit agencies and hundreds 
of enterprises from ropemaking to laundries and super­
markets run by the m i l i t a r y . A l t h o u g h  the number of 
federal corporations grew to their peak during World War 
II, many were merely adaptions of their World War I 
precedents. Again, many of these were easily liquidated 
after the War since they were considerably integrated 
into the overall emergency organization.
While Congress recognized that this increasingly 
large body of organizations needed to be effectively 
controlled, the debate of conflicting emotions regarding 
government corporations continued. Conservatives wanted 
government to be "run in a more business-like manner", 
but also often viewed public corporations as a threat to 
the private sector, arguing that TVA shouldn't be in the 
power business. Simultaneously, liberals argued for an 
autonomous TVA, but were concerned about the erosion of 
accountability to the Executive Branch and Congress.
According to Moe, "James Burnham, a critic of TVA,
saw in this government corporation, the triumph of a new
managerial class that sought to usurp the fundamental
institutions of democracy to serve their own class 
18purposes." Meanwhile, Philip Selznick observed, "In
America...the TVA is unquestionably a rallying point for
19those who favor a welfare state." The value of the 
autonomous federal corporation for Lilienthal was the 
fact that it gave considerable powers to public
17
administrators who were "closer to the people" than the
20bureaucracy in Washington.
In 1941, Herman Pritchett addressed an irony 
surrounding the government corporation; "The paradox is 
that government corporations remain and even increase in
21number while the government corporation is passing away." 
Pritchett, a long time proponent of the corporate form, 
was referring to the successful efforts of the late 1930's 
to apply standard administrative procedures to most cor­
porations, i.e. the Brownlow Report. He further surmised,
"It becomes increasingly difficult and unwise to 
talk about the 'government corporation', for the 
attributes which marked the earlier federal cor­
porations and made them representatives of a 
distinctive type of administrative organization 
have been disappearing before our eyes, like the 
Cheshire cat. Soon there may be nothing left but 
a smile to mark the spot where the government 
corporation once stood."22
Pritchett may have had reason for concern. The 
corporate form was about to experience a major historical 
landmark. Legislative control began at the close of 
World War II, occurring in 1945 in two stages. Senator 
Harry Byrd's (D-VA) Joint Committee on Reduction of 
Nonessential Federal Expenditures studied the government 
corporation dilemma. The Committee concluded that the 
use of the corporate concept had been diminished to a 
tangled maze of quasi-governmental corporations with 
little Congressional and Executive oversight, few fiscal 
controls, and many instances of direct competition with 
the private sector. The George Act was enacted in February
18
of that year, which required GAO to audit annually the 
financial transactions of all government corporations. 
However, in December, the more comprehensive Government 
Corporation Control Act (Control Act) superseded these 
audit requirements.
The Government Corporation Control Act (194 5)
The most significant outcomes of the Control Act 
were the mandates for improved budgeting procedures, the 
GAO requirements to audit and report on government corpora­
tion activities to Congress, and finally, the control over 
financial transactions by Treasury. Originally, most 
corporations were exempted from Budget Bureau (now 0MB) 
procedures. It was believed that since most corporations 
had been free from the requirements seeking Congressional 
appropriations, there was no need for Budget Bureau 
review. However, the Budget Bureau influenced the Control 
Act legislation sufficiently to demand the requirement 
that wholly-owned government corporations had to submit 
an annual "business-type budget" or "plan of operation". 
GAO auditing requirements also had been exempted from most 
previous legislation creating corporations. Moreover, 
the Act is not a general incorporation act, and therefore, 
the charter for each federal government corporation is 
created by the enabling legislation passed by Congress. 
This portion of the Act was designed primarily to assure 
that no corporation would henceforth be created by an 
agency or a corporation, as had been done by the RFC.
19
Subsequently, this feature alone has given considerable
organizational flexibility to Congress.
Of course, Pritchett was among the critics of the
new Act, In 194 6, he wrote pessimistically, "the American
experience with autonomous public corporations is sub-
23stantially at an end". According to Pritchett, Congress 
in its effort to assure public accountability, had 
sacrificed the managerial flexibility that had made public 
enterprises potentially creative units of government.
However, despite such criticism of the Act which has con­
tinued to the present, "no persuasive evidence has been 
presented to demonstrate that the Control Act failed either 
to provide effective accountability and control or
impaired the capability of government corporations to
24function in a business-like manner".
Indeed, Harold Seidman has termed the Control Act 
25the "Decontrol Act". Seidman claims the Act was kept 
deliberately broad in approach for political reasons, 
and notes that it provided qualitative rather than quan­
titative reviews of corporate budgets. Moreover, he believes 
the Act protected financial and managerial flexibility 
from further erosion by the central managerial agencies, in 
particular the Budget Bureau. Seidman observes, "the 
Corporation Control Act is one of the most significant 
developments in the art of public administration. With
it the government corporation can be said to have come of
26age in the United States". However, Seidman may express
20
an unusually favorable attitude toward this law since he 
was on the Government Corporations staff of the Budget 
Bureau during the initial years of its implementation.
Subsequent Developments
Following the peak of activity during World War II,
use of the corporate form in the next decade or two waned
considerably. Writing in 1970, Albert Abel concluded,
"that trend will probably continue in the near future.
Scandals in the operation of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, which caused or at least occasioned its
termination, have put federal government corporations as
27a class on the defensive before public opinion." In 1954, 
Wartime corporations were terminated and the RFC and its 
subsidiaries were liquidated, cutting the number of 
government corporations in half.
Furthermore, after passage of the Control Act, the 
departmental "integrationist" philosophy continued to 
gain strength as did a dubious attitude toward autonomous 
organizations, generally. More and more government 
corporations were under the umbrella of departmental 
structures. "For example, the Saint Lawrence Seaway 
Development Corporation was established in 1954. Its 
main purpose after construction of the Seaway was to co­
operate with its Canadian counterpart in the control and 
operation of the Seaway. However, in 1966 it was placed 
in the newly created Department of Transportation and.
21
subjected to the direction and supervision of the Secretary
28of Transportation."
This trend was paralleled by a debate in Congress 
and by scholars over what characteristics were considered 
essential to the corporation in federal government. Then 
in 194 8, the debate culminated when President Truman in 
his Budget Message addressed criteria for creation of a 
government corporation. According to Truman, a corporation 
should only be created when a program:
1) is predominantly of a business nature;
2) is revenue-producing and potentially self- 
sustaining;
3) involves a large number of business-type trans­
actions with the public;
4) requires greater flexibility than the customary 
type of appropriations budget ordinarily permits.
Since this list of criteria is all financially related, 
and does not address policy autonomy, Truman's message may 
be interpreted to argue that federal corporations are 
nothing more than "agencies" with only certain financial 
discretion. Indeed, Goldberg and Seidman have argued, 
"despite some resemblance to its private prototype in 
outward form and operating methods, from the viewpoint of 
purpose and overall government organization, the government 
corporation is merely another agency of government".
This view also coincides with a 1945 Supreme Court opinion 
regarding government corporations as agencies in the case 
of Cherry Cotton Mills vs. the United States:
22
"That the Congress chose to call it (Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation) a corporation does not alter its 
characteristics so as to make it something other than 
what it actually is, an agency selected by the Govern­
ment to accomplish purely governmental purposes".31
Finally, the first Hoover Commission, meeting between 
1947 and 1949, and its resulting Report are noteworthy post­
war developments of the corporate concept. Essentially, the 
Commission advocated the corporate form in government stating, 
"we recommend that straight-line business activities be 
incorporated so as to secure greater flexibility in manage­
ment and simpler accounting, budgeting, and auditing 
32methods". However, the Commission Report gave little 
credence to policy autonomy, clearly wanting control to be 
focused within the Chief Executive. The Report recommended 
that the executive branch be reorganized to "establish a 
clear line of control from the President to those depart­
ment and agency heads and from them to their subordinates 
with correlative responsibility from these officials to 
the President, cutting through the barriers which have in 
many cases made bureaus and agencies partially independent 
of the Chief Executive".
Throughout the 1950's the debate continued between 
those who argued that the federal corporation should be 
awarded policy autonomy, and those who felt the corporation 
should be "integrated"; the "integrationists" believing 
that special financing mechanisms were the key distinctions 
from federal agencies. Marshall Dimock was a chief pro­
ponent of complete policy autonomy, and thought corporations
23
should be accountable to Congress, not the President: 
"Congress is the overall board of directors...".^* While 
Harold Seidman, upholding his view that these federal 
corporate bodies are not distinguishable from "agencies", 
argued corporations are "full-fledged members of the 
government team"^^ and thus, should be accountable to the 
President.
The Current Situation
The Range of Government Corporation Activities
The notion that emerged in the 1950's that federal 
corporations could be both politically accountable and 
financially independent, rapidly became a dying issue. 
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, leaders and 
public administrators apparently grew indifferent to the 
corporate form; little was written on the subject, and few 
federal corporations were being established.
However, enthusiasm for corporations grew after the 
successful launching of the Communications Satellite 
Corporation (ComSat) by legislation in 1962. ComSat was 
not established as a government corporation, but rather a 
private, for-profit corporation sponsored by the govern­
ment, possessing attractive advantages which encouraged 
lawmakers in their search for alternate forms of organiza­
tion to solve difficult and on-going problems. Though 
"no other entity approaches ComSat in its complexity 
some of its characteristics appear to a degree in later
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private, government-sponsored corporations.
For this reason, ComSat was an important precedent 
toward establishing the new breed of corporations in 
recent decades. Public opinion toward government corpora­
tions would be reshaped by the shining example of ComSat: 
a problem was being addressed by the federal government 
without a new department being created, adding to the 
"bureaucracy". Harold Seidman claims that ComSat was an 
important precedent not only because it appeared to bridge 
the gap between the private and public sectors and proved 
commercially viable, but because it also provided an 
example to many on "how to beat the system".
In the two decades since ComSat*s creation, a 
numerous variety of government corporate entities have 
sprung into existence. The range of government corpora­
tion services and operations is enormous. There are many 
corporations who for years have provided vitally important 
functions to the public, and who regionally, if not 
nationally have a major impact on the economy, i.e. TVA 
and the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.
The variety of activity may cover anything from the 
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation which awards grants 
to stimulate housing improvement in depressed cities, to 
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation and the F.D.I.C. 
Insurance, savings associations, security brokers and 
private pension funds are all services provided by a 
major group of government corporations. Another large
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group of federal corporations provides or buys mortgages,
loans, loan and price guarantees or price agreements, or
enters into joint ventures, i.e. the U.S. Synthetic Fuels
Corporation. The Government National Mortgage Association
has guaranteed close to $100 billion in mortgage-backed
securities; and the Synfuels Corporation has been provided
$20 billion out of an $88 billion authorization for loan
guarantees and price supports to stimulate the development
38of a synthetic fuels industry.
Therefore, the largest number of corporations offer
insurance or financial services, often at subsidized rates.
According to Walsh, "most federal enterprise activities...
are banking and insurance-related activities...(which) do
not compete with private financial establishments, but
generally absorb some risks from the private sector and
39expand markets for private services".
Only a minority of federal enterprises or corpora­
tions provide material, revenue-producing goods and 
services, i.e. electricity, fertilizer (TVA), supplies, 
equipment (Federal Prison Industries), and railway and 
seaway services (Amtrak, Conrail, St. Lawrence Seaway).
The Inter-American Foundation, the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting, and the Legal Services Corporation do not 
produce revenue, but award grants. Significantly, most 
corporations deal with the public, or with private sector 
organizations, or individuals who are all defined by the 
terms of the enabling statute. However, there are a few
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whose dealings are only with government agencies and othei 
government corporations., i.e the Federal Financing Bank 
and the Federal Prison Industries.
Impact on the Economy and Credit Markets?
A great part of the difference between a corporation 
and an agency arises from the method of financing its 
operations. A corporation's funds are generally derived 
from such sources as capital appropriations, which are not 
subject to fiscal year limitations, revenues, and borrowings 
from the Treasury or the public. Corporations are rarely 
dependent on annual appropriations for their funds, other 
than a few exceptions: the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation,
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (administrative 
expenses) and the T.V.A. (nonrevenue programs).
In general, it may be said that the system of annual
appropriations is inapplicable to government corporations
involved in business operations, and needing the necessary
flexibility. However, according to John McDiarmid, "some
critics have characterized permanent appropriations,
revolving funds, and initial capitalizations as 'back-door
treasury hand-outs' that defeat the purpose of democratic
government and give the recipients license to extravagance 
4 0and waste". It is difficult to counter the arguement 
that public monies must be controlled, but financial 
control of government corporations should be monitored in 
other ways besides annual appropriations. Otherwise, the 
maximum benefits of the corporate form are not realized.
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McDiarmid cites an interesting post-World War I
example of agency dependence on annual appropriations by
the Inland and Coastwise Waterways Service which became
a "target of scathing c r i t i c i s m " G e n e r a l  Ashburn was
the chief of the Service, and blamed many of its failures
upon the dependence on annual appropriations:
"Its inability to finance itself in periods of 
depression, thus necessitating an appeal to Congress 
for funds, opening the flood gates of criticism with 
the resultant agitation as to whether or not Congress 
will, through failure to appropriate, cause the 
cessation of an operation that is economically sound, 
the destruction of a solvent transportation agency, 
the failure of a successful waterway demonstration, 
because of the law against a Government agency 
creating a deficit; and under the limits set by such 
conditions the line is incapable of expansion unless 
there be a further extension of governmental 
ownership".
As a government corporation dependent on annual
appropriations, the T.V.A. represents the other side of
the arguement, enjoying a history of relatively little
difficulty in obtaining funds and still remaining free from
Congressional interference in policy matters. However,
the noncommercial nature of many of T.V.A.'s functions is
an important consideration here. T.V.A. also obtains much
of its funds by issuing revenue bonds. This is one reason
why T.V.A. can easily be characterized as half agency and
half corporation; "alternating between the two categories
42as it's politically convenient".
A government corporation assigned a commercial 
activity requires flexibility to respond promptly to 
changes in the market demand for its services. For
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example, credit agencies have to adjust to changes in the 
money markets. If Congress insisted on annual and line- 
item limit, tions in a corporation budget, the purpose 
would be defeated for creating a corporate body in the 
first place.
However, the political reality of the matter has 
dictated that unless a corporation is totally, or at least 
partially self-sustaining. Congress will always control 
annual appropriations. The Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop­
ment Corporation generates its own operating funds through 
toll collection. Therefore, the Corporation is not appro­
priated funds annually. Rather, Congressional control is 
exercised by authorization of expenditures for the 
Corporation.
Although, currently the political and economic 
debate surrounding government enterprise funding is 
centered on the 'off-budget' issue. The question con­
tinually posed: What is the impact on the economy and
the credit markets of the billions hidden in credit
authority for government 'off-budget enterprises' or 
4 3"OBE's"? While many of these federal enterprises have 
continued to expand their attractive credit terms, it 
remains law that the financial activities for many 
government corporations are excluded from the budget.
In Washington, this issue has turned into a raging politi­
cal debate, becoming a key target of the Reagan Adminis­
tration's "budget-cutting mentality", i.e, the U.S.
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Synthetic Fuels Corporation's obligational authority was 
cut last summer by $5.2 billion.
For FY'80, government corporations alone possessed 
$175 billion in credit a u t h o r i t y . I n  FY'81, government- 
sponsored enterprises generated half of the unreported 
deficit, equaling $23.6 b i l l i o n . F u r t h e r ,  many govern­
ment-sponsored enterprises are granted special preferences 
and certain tax exemptions which permit them to borrow 
funds for government purposes at rates only slightly above 
the Treasury's own rates and lend the money to certain 
specified groups. Thus, some federally sponsored enter­
prises are private in name only, and are yet another way 
in which the federal government directs the allocation of 
billions of dollars of credit without being subject to 
the federal budget review process. Contrary to Annmarie 
Walsh in The Public's Business, it is often agreed that 
such special assistance granted federally sponsored enter­
prises may hinder the development of private firms which 
would compete in performing similar services, and possibly 
more efficiently.
The managerial and financial flexibility for commer­
cial government enterprises is only one reason for 'off- 
budget ' spending. Political motivations by Congress are 
often another advantage of the 'off-budget' mechanism. 
Politicians can subsidize a particular group without 
resorting to the appropriations process by enacting 
various forms of "sweetheart legislation". The benefits
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here are not only avoi ;ing the requirement to be counted
in the annual deficit total, but also eliminating possible
program funding cuts likely in the annual appropriations
process. "As one budget analyst puts its, keeping the
Federal Financing Bank off-budget 'enables on-budget
agencies to redirect economic resources and promote their
goals without affecting the on-budget outlays'. Congress'
own research arm, the Congressional Research Service, is
more blunt. The existence of off-budget programs, it says,
4 7'disguises the size of the government's activities'."
However, the long term economic disadvantages for
many programs to remain off-budget pose a strong arguement
for on-budget reporting. Primarily, opponents of these
OBE's argue the devastating affects on the deficit. 0MB
questions the need for budget flexibility for corporations
to include exemption from budget totals and the budget
review process. Of course, GAO argues that on-budget
reporting strengthens accountability: credit financing
involving money derived by government borrowing should be
on-budget, and subject to on-budget limitations, regardless
of the structure of the corporation, i.e. wholly-owned,
48mixed public-private, or private.
Appendix II charts six corporations which GAO has 
defined as receiving federal funds and reporting their 
funding off-budget, either entirely or in part. Since 
their financing is excluded from the budget, it is 
naturally feared that federal management and financial
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control is sever-. *.y weakened. Furthermore, excluding these 
corporations from the budget understates the budget totals 
in terms of budget authority, receipts, and outlays. Con­
sequently, this results in an unclear picture of federal 
spending, revenues, liability, and deficit.
Moreover, total spending authority for these corpor­
ations includes not only authority to spend appropriated 
and borrowed funds, defined as budget authority, but also 
authority to spend other funds such as repayments of loans 
and charges for services. These gross obligations obvious­
ly present a clearer picture of spending authority than 
does budget authority alone. GAO observes,
"for Congress to decide on budget totals and to make 
priority allocations among functions under the budget 
process, it must have complete information on the 
total levels of federal activities. On-budget 
reporting of financial transactions of these cor­
porations would strengthen overall financial 
accountability in the federal government by provid­
ing information essential to long range forecasts 
of revenues and expenditures. It would also 
strengthen management control by subjecting these 
corporations to the full range of executive and 
congressional decisionmaking processes".49
Currently, the Administration is making efforts to 
require that corporations submit their budgets to 0MB.
It is noteworthy that this current struggle for financial 
control of federal corporations transcends the demands 
for control debated in the post-war period. However, it 
will be politically difficult to impose financial disci­
pline on corporations which submit their budgets directly 
to Congress.
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Flexibility Versus Accountability 
Use of the corporate form is a response to the lack 
of flexibility defined by the parameters of a government 
agency. This corporate freedom is necessary, it is argued, 
in order for the organization to successfully maneuver 
within a commercial environment. However, without mana­
gerial prudence and restraint, public corporations may 
tread on dangerous territory, flouting the policies and 
authority of the Chief Executive to whom they are politically 
accountable. It is essential that the President have the 
power to coordinate policies applying to government enter­
prises with those of the government as a whole.
According to its opponents, the Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation has lacked political accountability, especially 
in regard to the executive branch. Although the President 
appoints the Synfuels Board, SFC does not have an over­
sight agency which certainly diminishes the political 
clout of the Administration regarding synfuels policymaking.
A closer study of this point will be discussed in Chapter III 
Creation of public corporations reflect a disenchant­
ment with federal government organization and personnel, 
a belief that the corporate form is superior to the 
federal agency model, and a desire for flexibility in 
policy-making. The reasons behind the drive for flexibility 
are many : no civil service regulations, no conflict of
interest rules, and likely avoidance of the Congressional 
appropriations process. However, from a public
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administration perspective, some believe the corporate 
trend has a debilitating effect upon government institu­
tions and the civil service. Harold Seidman argues that 
the increasing reliance on government-sponsored enter­
prises deflects us from addressing the real problem: How
can we make the federal government more responsive and 
accountable in a continuously changing environment?^^
In recent years, the problem has only been compounded 
Political response to each new national dilemma is often to 
create another public enterprise. Politically, this gives 
the illusion of a 'quick fix'. Rather than reform highly 
rigid and entangled personnel and administrative proce­
dures in the bureaucracy, legislators find it easier to 
simply exempt new corporations from these onerous require­
ments. But the overall effect weakens the ability of 
core agencies to become more developed and innovative.
This is coupled by the existence of quasi-independent 
corporations performing public mandates, but often with 
minimal accountability to politically responsible 
officials. Seidman believes that the politics between 
the Administration and Congress only continues to encour­
age the situation: "The proliferation of 'twilight
zone' agencies is likely to continue as long as the 
President and Congress insist on playing a political 
shell game with federal employment statistics and off- 
budget federal expenditures".^^
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But ironically, in its drive for administrative 
flexibility, Congress has exempted many corporations from 
Executive controls and then burdened them with controls 
of its own. Often such controls may limit the ability 
to reach statutory objectives. For example, the Energy 
Security Act, establishing the SFC, provides for numerous 
legislative vetos, personnel and budget ceilings, and an 
Inspector General which is unprecedented for government 
corporations.
In conclusion, the current situation is one of 
disarray and inconsistency, and has evolved for several 
reasons. Although more stringent controls often evolve 
as compensation, the Government Corporation Control Act 
has been increasingly ignored and many new corporations 
have been excluded from its provisions. Also, constit­
uencies and their sponsoring Congressional committees 
combine efforts to achieve independence from controls by 
the Administration. So each new corporation is created 
in an ad hoc and varied manner. Thus, clear precedents 
for establishing a balance between flexibility and account­
ability are often missing. In fact, it appears that 
often the management of the new corporation is left to 
judge where this balance will be found. However, as noted 
in the SFC case study, this situation often leaves the 
possibility for managerial abuse wide open.
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Government Corporation Autonomy: Fact or Fiction?
While traditional theory suggests that federal 
corporations should act at "arm's length" from core 
government entities, practice may prove this a legal 
fiction. Studies in the U.S. reveal that, if anything, 
government corporations are highly controlled. The fact 
remains that these corporations operate in a political and 
economic system which is interdependent rather than 
independent. The public enterprise must interact with 
government and non-government institutions on whom they 
may depend.
However, the traditional defense of the autonomous
government corporation concept relies heavily on the
analogy of the private corporation. But the 194 8 Hoover
Commission Report was antagonistic toward this autonomous
concept. In a 1949 issue of the American Political Science
Review, Marshall Dimock, led the counterattack, arguing
that a board of directors was an indepensable feature of a
'true* government corporation, and that because public
corporations rarely made political or policy oriented
decisions, accountability to the President was not a
52critical element for these public entities.
Writing in 1952, Harold Seidman initially debated 
the view that a board of directors is essential for 
governing a public corporation. In so doing, he also 
attacked the belief that such organizations are or should 
be autonomous. In fact, over the years, Seidman appears
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to argue that the whole concept of autonomy only invites
abuse. "Government corporations are organized to a-
chieve a public purpose authorized by law. This fact
is often forgotten. So far as purpose is concerned, a
corporation cannot be distinguished from any government 
«53agency.
Seidman*s arguments may be especially poignant
in the complex political and policy-making process of
the 1980's. It may well be impossible and/or unwise
to divorce any public entity from the mainstream of
other political and economic institutions. "Autonomy",
claims Seidman, "is two edged. It means not only
freedom from outside direction and control, but also
exclusion from the 'official family' and close working
relationships with top policy-making officials. These
informal day-to-day associations afford an official
(and an organization) the most favorable opportunity
54to influence policy determinations."
Indeed, examples of two government corporations 
and their relative effectiveness within the public 
arena may illustrate the varying desirability of the 
autonomy concept. The Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop­
ment Corporation created in 1953 was designed to be 
headed by a single administrator. Since 1966 it has 
been under the Secretary of Transportation for policy 
purposes, thereby directly making the organization
accountable to the President. Apparently, this corpora­
tion is regarded as well managed and as achieving its 
mission.
On the other hand, the SFC was designed to be 
governed by a board of directors. As we shall discover 
in the case study, this may well have been a political 
mistake and a detriment to the organization's mission, 
especially since the entity is non-revenue producing. 
Furthermore, although highly controlled by Congress, 
there exists some curious twists in the SFC enabling 
legislation that allow for generous autonomy, especially 
in relation to the Executive Branch. It can be con­
vincingly argued that such a unique set of freedoms 
and restraints spelled political disaster from the 
start for the SFC.
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The U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation
Analysis of History/Enacting^ Legislation/Mission 
In order to fully appreciate the genesis of the 
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation, it is necessary to 
reflect on political history, particularly during the 
latter half of the Carter Administration. In 1980, the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian terrorists. 
The Middle East was a caldron of crises. The Organiza­
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries was blackmailing 
the United States with oil prices that had reached 
$41 per barrel. U.S. policymakers feared a cutoff of 
foreign crude would cripple the economy and threaten 
national security. Against this backdrop of fear and 
insecurity, political hysteria was rampant in Washington 
Motivated by such a scenario, undoubtedly both real 
and imagined. Congress bullishly created the federally 
financed Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC).
The SFC was established by the Energy Security 
Act, signed by President Carter on June 30, 1980. The 
mandate of the Corporation was to stimulate industry 
to produce 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil
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equivalent by 1987 and 2,000,000 barrels per day by 
1990, enough to substantially reduce U.S. dependence 
on imported oil. In an effort to accomplish these 
production levels, the Act envisioned two stages for 
awarding financial assistance toward creating a syn­
thetic fuels program. The first phase called for 
funding of up to $20 billion, followed by a second 
phase in which authorized funding could reach an 
additional $68 billion. Moreover, the Act directed 
the Corporation to issue a series of solicitations 
encompassing a diversity of technologies, i.e. coal 
liquefaction, coal gasification, syncrude from oil 
shale, peat to methanol, and tar sands development.
At the onset, a special Treasury account, known 
as the Energy Security Reserve was established with 
$17.5 billion in funds from which the SFC was author­
ized to grant direct loans, loan and price guarantees, 
purchase agreements, and joint venture participation. 
The government's financial backing was intended to 
help private utilities and pipeline and energy com­
panies borrow funds to build synthetic fuel plants.
In order to qualify, these companies could not be 
able to get credit elsewhere. Hundreds of these firms 
indicated their intention to seek these forms of 
assistance. There would be no direct cost to the 
government unless the project failed to operate, or
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the finished product was so expensive that it required 
a subsidy to be marketed.
Indeed, Congressional intention was that the 
newly created Corporation function somewhat similarly 
to an investment bank; a publicly funded entity, yet 
a 'business-like' organization void of political 
pitfalls. It was only through this public corporate 
medium that Congress felt it was possible to draw 
private sector interest toward synfuel development.
This public corporation would serve as common ground 
for negotiation to encourage private capital to invest 
in already proven synfuel technologies.
For the same reasons that Congress believed in 
198 0 that the new synfuels development program needed 
a corporate form, lawmakers also argued the necessity 
of attracting a specific caliber of business-minded, 
professional employees to staff the Corporation. Thus, 
Congress issued broad guidelines for recruiting and 
hiring what would be highly technical and specialized 
staff from private industry. The Act specified that 
the SFC could hire up to 300 professional employees, 
although total staffing has never peaked above 190^ 
employees. The belief was that ceilings for salary 
limitations had to be flexible and high enough in 
order to induce the talented personnel desired. It 
was believed that those worth attracting would not be
interested in being indentured to the government's 
overall GS rating system. Therefore, the protection 
and job security built into the Merit System would 
have no great appeal. Rather, the ideal staff was 
envisioned as those who wanted to get a job done 
quickly and leave for new challenges elsewhere.
Similarly, benefit packages, i.e. medical, retire­
ment, savings plans, vacation times, and the like, had 
to be competitive with private sector counterparts. 
Therefore, the initial staff were given free rein to 
construct many of the highly competitive benefits that 
are in effect today at the Corporation, and which sur­
pass most of those offered to personnel of government 
agencies.
The powers of the Corporation are vested in a 
Board of Directors comprised of a chairman and six 
directors. Members of the Board are appointed by the 
President subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate, 
and serve seven-year terms. The Chairman of the Board 
serves as chief executive officer of the Corporation. 
The existence of a Board of Directors is often a key 
element in defining obvious differences between public 
corporations and agencies.
Another important specification of the Energy 
Security Act required the Corporation to submit to 
Congress by mid-1984 a comprehensive strategy for
achievement of the national synthetic fuels production 
goals. The report, known as the Recommended Comprehen­
sive Strategy (RCS) was intended to consider all 
practicable means for commercial production of synthetic 
fuels and their relationship to national security, in­
cluding the feasibility of utilizing synthetic fuels to 
meet defense fuel requirements. Among other issue, the 
RCS was expected to address the economic and technolog­
ical feasibility and environmental effects of projects 
already funded by the Corporation as well as recommend 
the dimensions of any continued federal role in the 
development of a synthetic fuels industry. Upon Con­
gressional approval of the RCS, it was originally 
proposed that the additional $68 billion would be 
appropriated to implement the strategy.
On paper, the SFC appears to be an effective 
approach for creating a synthetic fuels industry. 
However, many issues and events since the organization's 
creation have intercepted making the results less 
than successful. First of all, changing conditions 
of world oil markets seriously displaced this infant 
industry. Secondly, the SFC has been used repeatedly 
as a political football, particularly between the 
Administration and Congress. Third, although the 
organization went to great lengths to recruit high 
caliber staff, the SFC has been riddled with problems 
concerning management and personnel.
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However, perhaps the idealistic intentions 
originally conceived for the Corporation were in and 
of themselves political pitfalls. Ironically, the 
elements that made the organization 'business-like* 
and professional were also the issues that forced the 
SFC straight into controversy within its first year 
of business. Within months, most of the highest paid 
officers left under political fire surrounding the 
issue of their salaries. Moreover, in the years 
following there has been a train of executives exiting 
the Corporation for reasons which, of course, extend 
beyond the salary and benefits controversy. Generally, 
the often alleged issue of poor management continues 
to haunt the corridors of the organization. However, 
as may be proved by reviewing the SFC case, the desira­
bility of congressionally mandating a Board of Directors 
for all public corporations can be argued. In the 
Synfuels case, the Board is a highly politicized body, 
often nothing more than a tool, shamelessly used by 
Administration officials.
The RCS has still not been written. The Policy 
Development staff within the SFC which was discharged 
with the mission of developing the RCS has since been 
terminated and their floor space at the Corporation's 
headquarters stands vacant. Tom Corcoran, a newly 
appointed Reagan Board Member now holds the reins for 
producing the RCS document.
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The huge Great Plains project in North Dakota 
scheduled to produce 21,000 BOED^ by 1988, is currently 
struggling to close a deal with the politically delibera­
tive Board of the SFC. This project languishes for 
numerous reasons, but primarily because the SFC in­
herited it from the Department of Energy where the 
project was awarded $2.02 billion in loan guarantees 
in 1979. Now, the project is requesting $820 million 
in price guarantees from the SFC. If such assistance 
is not received, project sponsors threaten to abandon. 
However, the real issue here is that the financial 
term sheet between the SFC and the projects' sponsors 
has been agreed upon and in place since April 1984. In 
recent months, particularly, the tactic used by the SFC 
Board seems to be one of continually stalling for time. 
Simultaneously, the Great Plains project increasingly 
is the focus of attention by 0MB, GAO, and various 
Congressional (oversight) Committees. As the Corporation 
has become more embroiled in bitter political controversy, 
so has the Great Plains project. Many observers be­
lieve that the funding or non-funding of the project is 
directly linked to the life or death of the SFC.
Unfortunately, at the time of this writing, in 
mid-1985, few if any of the legislated SFC directives 
have come to pass. In the beginning, it was feared 
the environmentalists alone would impede the development
of the infant synfuels industry. Instead, the sluggish 
world oil market and the SFC, itself, have been the 
spoilers. The Corporation has suffered from a con­
tinuous maze of economic and political miscalculations, 
overpublicized 'scandals', poor management, and a weary 
staff that is currently leaving in droves. Although 
there are already a few small experimental plants 
making synthetic gas and oil (including gasohol) in 
operation in the United States, the first large-scale 
production from huge oil-shale deposits underlying 
the high plains of the West, is a long way from being 
operative. After five years in business, the SFC has 
managed to fund only three currently operating projects: 
Cool Water, a small $120 million project, producing 
electricity from coal gasification in California; Dow 
Syngas, another coal gasification project in Louisiana; 
and Union Oil, an oil shale project on Colorado's 
western slope.
And yet, to date, the SFC has issued four different 
commercial solicitations. There are approximately ten 
large-scale commercial projects that were submitted 
for the Corporation's review and evaluation in earlier 
solicitations that have either reached an impasse in 
negotiations with the Corporation, are suffering from 
various financial and technological travails of their 
own, or are on the verge of withdrawing their 
proposals completely.
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All of the above are simply a synopsis of the 
symptoms and not the causes of why the SFC, an organiza­
tion with a well-intentioned program, has failed to 
accomplish so little in such a short time. To determine 
the causal reasons, a close examination of the SFC and 
its corporate form deserve scrutiny. If for no reason 
other than academic exercise, this scrutiny is deserved 
to determine why it is that some of our modern govern­
ment institutions, no matter what their form, simply 
are not working.
Issues and Problems 
In order to understand why the SFC has not lived 
up to its potential, we must consider several issues 
and problems. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, 
the following areas relating to the case study will be 
reviewed: 1) political and economic influences, 2)
managerial and organizational weaknesses, 3) staffing 
and personnel problems, 4) poor enabling legislation,
5) questions of autonomy versus oversight, and 6) 
Congressional liaisons.
Political and Economic Influences
"...(T)he establishment of a government corpora­
tion is typically an action of high political visibility. 
It is a conspicuous and symbolic way for elected 
officials to appear to be 'doing something' about a
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problem; they appear to be taking hold and decisive 
action. Establishing a corporation especially appeals 
to politicians when there appears to be crisis or some 
other alarming change in objective conditions. Such 
circumstances preceded the moves to create...the 
Synthetic Fuels Corporation."^
For decades, the relative expense had been the 
main obstacle to the development of alternatives to 
conventional fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal). 
Even as the economics of the overall energy situation 
radically changed in the early 1970's, government had 
refrained from adopting a synthetic fuels policy.
Many opponents objected to the feared environmental 
effects and the huge public subsidies that would be 
used for private energy projects. However, in 1979 
when the cutoff of Iranian oil put Americans back in 
the gasoline lines, elective officials grew anxious.
It was President Carter who proposed that a government 
corporation be created to encourage the construction 
of synthetic fuel plants. Congress quickly responded.
Unfortunately, many of the traditional reasons 
underlying the choice of a corporate form by elective 
officials were alive as the Energy Security Act was 
being developed. Elected officials recognize that 
there is usually a large reservoir of political capital 
to be utilized by the mere process of organization-
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building. Also, such organizations are different and 
newsworthy."...(T)hey provide their sponsors and support­
ers with a welcome, well-publicized opportunity to 
claim credit for responding to a tough situation in a 
creative way."^
Furthermore, the creation of the SFC as a public 
corporation undoubtedly provided sponsors with a mech­
anism to shift the blame onto someone else's shoulders, 
namely corporation management, as problems have mounted. 
After all, SFC management has had "independent" respon­
sibility for handling synfuels development. "Thus, 
in 1980, legislators uncertain as to the costs and 
benefits of a new set of allocation decisions passed 
the politically difficult task of awarding government- 
backed loans to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation.
Of course, another political attraction for 
utilizing the corporate form in Synfuels legislation 
was most certainly to perform the function without 
having the costs show up in the unified budget. 
Considering the huge funds necessary for synfuels 
development, this policy obviously held advantages 
for sponsors of the Energy Security Act. And elective 
officials, generally, want to make federal budget 
totals (or deficits) appear smaller than they really 
are.
Also, it was easy for sponsors to elicit support 
for synfuels in a corporate form due to the argument
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that such a complex undertaking had to be managed with 
effectiveness and efficiency. This was especially true 
given the abbreviated decision time forced by the 
impending "crisis",
A final dimension worth noting in reference to 
the Synfuels case was the timely attitude toward use 
of the government corporate form. In the last two 
decades as government intervention in industry, again, 
became acceptable, the corporate concept has experienced 
a tremendous resurgence, not known since the 1930's 
and early 1940's. Earlier skeptical observers have 
ceased to believe through experience that such institu­
tions are a sign of the "Red Menace" invading. So on 
all counts. Congress found easy arguments for justifying 
a synfuels corporation.
However, all one has to do today is read the 
press to realize the political potence showered on the 
SFC of 1980 has reverted 180 degrees in 1985. In many 
respects, the Corporation has suffered from too much 
advance billing, expectations caused by the passage 
of time and the politics of the times. It has been 
advertised as an $88 billion institution, but its 
actual authority in its initial period of operation 
was only set to be between $15 billion - $20 billion.
Its purpose is to help the U.S. reduce its dependence 
on six to eight million barrels per day of imported
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oil, but even its goal of "500,000 barrels per day by 
1987 was almost surely unattainable.
Significantly, it has been billed as an institution 
apart from government, but the Energy Security Act is 
larded with detailed directions and prohibitions. Such 
circunstances have undoubtedly caused the SFC much 
political strife, and to some degree or another has 
directly impeded the Corporation toward accomplishing 
its mandate.
While the politics that created and continues to 
shape the SFC has been influential on its performance, 
no discussion of the program would be complete without 
addressing the overall economics involved, too. The 
international oil economy was fragile in the 1970's, but 
as events have progressed, it appears that the ability 
of the market place to redress the imbalance between 
oil production and consumption requirements was under­
estimated at least in the near-term. And now that crude 
prices have plummeted, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to justify the currently projected prices of synfuels 
per barrel equivalent.
Consequently, the SFC has not only suffered a 
political battering, but an economic one, too. Ultimately, 
such political and economic realities have affected the 
performance of the Corporation in a myriad of ways.
One result has been that the degree of support from
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the general public for a Federally sponsored, commerci­
ally-oriented, synthetic fuels program seems to have 
diminished since 1981. Diminished public support, how­
ever, does not mean there is any less need for develop­
ment of synthetic fuels. The SFC, mindful of changing 
public attitudes, has modified both its short and long­
term objectives. The law sets the years 1985-1995 as 
the range for having a highly productive and cost 
competitive industry, but much evidence today suggests 
that realistically this goal could only be met in the 
years 2000-2010. The Chairman of the Board, Edward 
Noble, writing in January 1983, stated:
"1982 was a fast-paced and pivotal year in the 
shifting energy fortunes of all free world 
countries, whether net energy producer or 
consumer. For synthetic fuels, especially, it 
was a year of changing attitudes and adjustments. 
Early illusions and exaggerated expectations were 
replaced with much more realistic understanding 
of the role of synthetic fuels in national 
energy and economic policies."6
On a final note, potential project sponsors are
increasingly showing less interest in submitting their
project proposals for review and evaluation, staff
morale is at an all-time low, and a politically intangled
SFC Board seems defiantly résistent toward funding
projects currently before them.
Managerial and Organizational Weaknesses
From the outset, the SFC has suffered from 
acknowledged internal management problems. Recruited
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almost entirely from the private sector, the Corporate 
leadership has found it difficult to adjust to the 
complexities and ethical standards of Federal public 
service. Traditionally, SFC Board Members have had 
the attitude that they did not wish to be contaminated 
by government bureaucrats. They have failed to recognize 
that Congress and bureaucrats alone are not to blame for 
the complexities of public service.
For example, the Sunshine Act undoubtedly has 
contributed to the devisiveness of the Synfuels Board. 
Functioning in an open setting has been difficult or 
uncomfortable for many. Although, legally the Corpora­
tion is not an agency or instrumentality of the Federal 
Government, it is not in any way insulated from the 
demands of the press. Congress, GAO, the Inspector 
General, or the Freedom of Information Act. According 
to Ron Moe, "Successive officers have repeatedly 
employed private sector practices in Synfuels manage­
ment, rather than those of a Federal agency, and run 
afoul of 0MB, Congressional Committees, GAO, and the 
press.
In August 1983, the President of Synfuels,
Victor Schroeder, resigned under fire regarding 
accusations of mismanagement and improprieties of 
office. A Senate Government Affairs Subcommittee 
found that the Synfuels President had awarded 51
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Consulting contracts without competitive bidding, some
of them to past business associates. In the Washington
Post, Schroeder was quoted as saying,
"It makes no sense to put up personal services 
for competitive bid. Where else are you going 
to find people to do work the way you need it 
done, other than people you know or that someoneknows?"8
Also, regarding Schroeder, internal audit reports 
indicated questionable uses of corporate funds, namely 
charging $19,500 in broker's fees for the purchase of 
his home to the Corporation's relocation fund. Ulti­
mately, these funds were reimbursed. Anyway, the point 
here is that since Synfuels does not operate under 
standard federal rules, managers and employees enjoy 
maximum discretion in behavior, checked only by cor­
porate policies and possible publicity.
SFC supporters argue, however, that these freedoms 
are essential to attract talented private sector people 
and maintain the Corporation's highly autonomous 
character. Indeed, such freedoms may be necessary to 
achieve its purposes. In actuality, though, it would 
be better and less costly policy to appoint leadership 
who appreciates the balance between flexibility and 
accountability. Abuse of these managerial freedoms is 
often nothing more than a severe lack of understanding.
Some experts in the study of public corporations 
have a solution to managerial abuse which goes one step
farther: eliminate the requirement for a board altogether
in the enabling legislations of public corporations. In 
its place, full leadership authority would be vested in 
the CEO. While such a concept initially sounds radical, 
there are many government enterprises that do not have 
a board of directors, or the board is simply ex officio 
in nature, i.e. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Public enterprises in Japan (there are 102 at the 
national level) rarely have boards, and if one does 
exist, they are never authoritarian, of course.
Unfortunately, in the U.S. the habit of assigning 
public corporations a board is often an effort to 
duplicate the organizational structure of private sector 
counterparts. However, in the public sector, the board 
may simply become a caldron for political meddling, 
especially when the members are political loyalists of 
the Administration as in the Synfuels case. Further­
more, the SFC case displayed several times how the 
progression of programs are easily stymied, if for any 
reason a quorum is impossible. Following Vic Schroeder*s 
resignation as President in August 1983, other Board 
Members continued to resign for various reasons, i.e. 
conflict of interest, etc. Eventually, only one Member 
and the Chairman were left. It is fair to say that 
most of 1984 for the SFC was void of any real decision­
making capability. In an election year, the Administration
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and Congress both were hesitant toward allowing the 
Corporation to fund billion dollar projects, so the 
necessary board members were deliberately not appointed. 
Essentially, this case illustrates how an "independent" 
corporation can be held hostage, as the use of a board 
was abused by other governmental powers.
In conclusion, unless the board is ex officio, 
use of this concept can be disasterous. It is not 
necessary, nor mandated by an act of Congress, and most 
importantly, the board approach may have the potential 
for insulation against sound public policy.
Management experts seem to agree that many cor­
porations with excellent organizational structures 
fail for lack of talented people and many corporations 
with poor organizational structures succeed because 
they have talented people. At this point in its 
history, the SFC needs its talented people and a sound 
organizational structure built upon recognized manage­
ment principles. However, these elements alone will 
not solve all the Corporation's management problems 
without the essential added ingredient of strong 
leadership.
Through most of its history, the SFC organizational 
structure at the staff level, particularly, has been 
sound. Senior management has changed frequently without
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severely disrupting much of the daily staff functions. 
Much of the credit for this phenomenon goes to the strong 
matrix organization in operation. It has functioned 
adequately to achieve the objectives of the Energy 
Security Act in project solicitation, evaluation, and 
negotiation processes. Indeed, if there are any dis­
crepancies in the current structure, once again they 
can be linked to higher management. The case of the 
Policy Development Group, given the mission to complete 
the RCS, offers a clear example of this argument.
Although, the SFC Board had been directed by 
Congress to formulate a strategic operational plan 
regarding the RCS, management failed to grasp the 
"operational" character of this guidance. Instead, 
early in the Corporation's history, management chose 
to create a separate Policy Development office, 
independent of the operational mainstream of the 
Corporation. Providing little guidance, it charged 
that office with preparing a document to be presented 
as the Corporation's proposed comprehensive strategy 
to Congress. Time elasped, and new management did not 
effect significant organizational changes, even after 
a quorum of the Board was finally reconstituted.
Thus, the planning function continued to be 
isolated from the rest of the Corporation. This 
organizational separation was compounded by personality
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differences and 'turf disputes which went unresolved 
by senior management. Under the direction of 3 success­
ive vice presidents, the planning staff was left to set 
its own course. Their efforts were blown beyond 
necessary proportions, requiring numerous outside 
studies, which would have resulted in a report of massive 
volume.
During all this time, the Board and Senior manage­
ment had not focused on the progress of the strategy.
It wasn't until mid-1983, a year before the congressional 
deadline for submittal, that Board Members expressed a 
sense of concern about what the Policy Development Group 
was doing. Accordingly, the Board decided to become 
directly involved by creating a Board oversight 
committee.
Through the Board's involvement much of the 
earlier RCS work was re-directed. The Policy Development 
Group originally had called for input from the Projects, 
Technology and Engineering, and Finance Groups. The 
Board accepted this idea willingly, but ironically, 
months passed before these Groups were contacted for 
their inputs. Indeed, much of the plans for the 
development of the RCS have evolved without any con­
tributions from other vice presidents. This has been 
unfortunate as the RCS cannot be effectively developed 
without integrating the talents and knowledge of all
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the professionals within the SFC who have worked in the 
synfuels program for the past few years.
Historically, the cooperation between the Policy 
Development Group and other groups in the Corporation 
has not been good. The Vice President position of the 
Policy Group was vacant for six months in 1983, and 
at the close of that year the new Vice President was 
announcing his resignation. Corporation rumors held 
that the Board was behind this resignation as the 
individual was not leading the Policy Group in the 
direction desired by the Board to complete the RCS. 
Accompanying the difficulties caused by changing leader­
ship had been a history of personnel upheaval. The 
staffing buildup, partially because of the initial 
incorrect scoping of the mission, was too large and 
included some skills duplicative of those already 
existent in the Corporation.
In its final months, the Policy Group without a 
vice president, attempted to secure closer cooperation 
with other groups in the Corporation with indifferent 
success. For various reasons, the Policy Group had 
difficulty getting substantial help from other offices 
in the Corporation. Again, senior management did not 
smooth out these obstacles, and did not issue directives 
to assure that the Policy Group would get the kind of 
assistance it needed as directed by the Board of Directors
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In November 1984, the Reagan Administration 
finally appointed three additional Board Members, at 
last giving the SFC the quorum it lacked for much of 
that year. Of course, the new directors appear to 
reflect Reagan's traditional belief that energy alter­
natives should only be developed through the free 
market approach. Consistent with this belief. Board 
policies have been to self-impose even greater staffing 
limitations than previous boards had planned. As of 
April 1, 1985, the last of the Policy Development staff 
were terminated. Only three other staff had previously 
been absorbed elsewhere in the Corporation. So by 
executive design, it had been determined that given 
the repeated problems of the Policy Group, and the 
desire to achieve the image of operating a 'tight ship', 
one board member alone would assume responsibility for 
writing the RCS —  Tom Corcoran, a former anti-synfuels 
Congressman, who bidded unsuccessfully for the Senate 
in the 1984 elections. The current draft circulating 
the Corporation is a greatly scaled-down version of 
what was initially imagined. A strategy that has cost 
the Corporation thousands of dollars and manpower 
hours, has now been reduced to 30 pages, and will be 
written by one individual. The date for submission 




A discussion of the SFC organization is not complete 
without highlighting personnel issues, especially the 
compensation and benefits package. Indeed, queries on 
personnel compensation issues are central to what has 
brought the Corporation under so much attack. They are 
also central elements for evaluating the nature of a 
government corporation, particularly in relation to 
other similar federal entities. But no other govern­
ment corporation has been promised such a large amount 
of public monies. So from the beginning, the SFC was 
totally enmeshed in partisan politics; and offering 
seemingly "generous" salaries and benefits only 
guaranteed that the Corporation would often be in the 
limelight.
In the final days of the Carter Administration, 
the President nominated John Sawhill as the first 
Chairman of the Board and five others as members of 
the Board. These appointments were made during 
congressional recess, and thus, had not been approved 
by the Senate. Congressional fury was only further 
aggravated when the Chairman's salary was set at $175, 000 
per year plus extensive fringe benefits. The Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel would be paid per 
annum $150,000 and $140,000, respectively. Similar 
salaries were set for other high officials, plus
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generous mov ? r r expenses, severance pay, and other 
allowances.
These compensation packages, plus extraordinary 
policy decisions by an unconfirmed Board of Directors, 
sent Congress into a panic, prompting the House Environ­
ment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee to 
conduct hearings. In a very negative and not completely 
accurate report, the Subcommittee summarized the feel­
ings of many SFC opponents when it said that the Board 
was "liberally dispensing salaries above executive pay
9scale". The Subcommittee felt that the Board had 
ignored the restrictions on compensation by "offering 
SFC officers lavish benefits far in excess of the 
benefits" for Federal employees and "frequently out­
stripping even those offered by major private 
corporations".^^ These are debatable points and will 
be discussed later, although they serve to underscore 
the controversy surrounding the SFC's compensation/ 
benefits package. SFC supporters, on the other hand, 
agreed with the Board that salaries comparable to the 
private sector were necessary to obtain the type of 
talent needed.
After Reagan became President in early 1981, the 
Board Members nominations were withdrawn and the officers 
resigned, under pressure, or accepted lower salaries. 
However, the Energy Security Act does allow the Board
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to establish a compensation schedule which can include 
salaries higher than Level 1 of the Executive Schedule. 
It was by using these guidelines, that the SFC's in­
itial Board created several senior management positions 
with salaries over $100,000 per year. At the close of 
1982, the Corporation had four officers paid salaries 
(exclusive of substantial benefits) in excess of those 
for Cabinet Officers; President, $135,000; Executive 
Vice President, $85,000; Vice President - Finance, 
$85,000; and Vice President - Technology, $108,000.^^ 
(Note; Due mostly to organizational restructuring, 
only the latter two positions remain above the 1984 
Cabinet level salaries. Of the former positions listed, 
the first is currently vacant, the second no longer 
exists).
It appears as though the early SFC Compensation 
decisions were made over several months and in a piece­
meal fashion. The Corporation approved most of its 
employees' salaries during October and November of 
1980. In December of the same year, the relocation 
assistance and general employee benefit packages were 
approved. It was not until January 1981 that Chairman 
Sawhill told the rest of the Board about special bene­
fits given to some of the SFC's officers— a package
12that was never approved by the entire board. At no 
time during this process was the overall monetary value
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of the complete package r e v i e w e d . T h i s  was an impor­
tant mistake, giving opponents added ammunition. The
value of compensation and benefits should be considered
14together, not separately. Whether or not the SFC's 
compensation and benefits package was or is justified, 
the way in which the Board went about evaluating and 
setting compensation seriously jeopardized the new 
package's credibility.
Before President Carter's interim Board departed. 
Chairman Sawhill had contract with the consulting firm. 
Towers, Perrin, Foster, and Crosby, Inc. (TPF&C).^^
TPF&C was asked to design a "total compensation system, 
including fringe benefits for the Chairman of the Board, 
Directors, officers and employees of the Corporation".^^ 
The report, used to justify the SFC's new compensation 
structure, was severely criticized. The consultants 
were attacked because there were so many recommended 
positions above Executive Level 1. Also, the report 
did not compare the SFC with other quasi-governmental 
or smaller private corporations. Instead, salary com­
parisons were made with giant private companies with 
sales of $3 to $6 billion and with financial institu­
tions with assets of over $10 billion. Most of these 
corporations had between 300 and 107,000 employees and 
many had world-wide operations. On the other hand, the 
SFC, restricted to 300 professional employees, has only
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one line of investment, and may make no more than ten 
to twelve financial arrangements.
While the TPF&C study was still in progress, the 
SFC Board was already approving employee salaries (a 
dubious action). The Board may have been uncomfor­
table in setting compensation levels while the TPF&C 
study was still incomplete, but needed to begin hiring 
to get the Corporation up and running. The Corporation 
would use the TPF&C salary structure as a guide for the 
next several months.
President Reagan became directly involved with
the SFC for the first time when acting Chairman Sawhill
sent a memo to the White House on January 27, 1981
announcing the selection and salary of another position :
the $120,000 per year Vice President of Technology.
The memo also included the names of six Vice Presidents
appointed by the Board, describing their position titles
dates of appointment, levels of compensation, prior
affiliation, and e d u c a t i o n . O n  February 25, 1981,
the President replied with a two-sentence memo to the
18Corporation simply stating that he did not approve. 
Although the President's memo had only applied to the 
V.P. for Technology, all but the V.P. for Planning said 
they would abide by the then Executive Level 1 cap of 
$69,630/year pending review by Reagan's new Board of 
Directors. The V.P. for Planning continued to received
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$140,000 per year until his employment was terminated 
on October 31, 1981. Aside, from the $69,630 cap, the 
Corporation continued to use the TPF&C salary struc­
ture .
Soon afterward. President Reagan fired the inter­
im Board, leaving the Corporation without a Board of 
Directors and unable to function. Unfortunately, the 
President was slow in making his appointments. The 
Board would not be operational again until October 1981.
As this time, in an effort to dampen mounting con­
gressional criticism, the Board again contracted with 
a consulting firm to review the Corporation's salary 
structure. The Board, in attempting to strike a balance 
between politics and business, emphasized two major 
points when contracting with Hay Associates;
1) Congressional intent that a comparability 
exist between the SFC salaries and Federal 
Pay schedules; and
2) The Corporation's need to attract and retain
19highly qualified and experienced personnel.
The Hay Associates' approach was unique and crea­
tive. Briefly, each position was assigned a number of 
points based on the analyses of three dimensions: tech­
nical knowledge, problem solving, and accountability. 
Significantly, the consultants revealed that the $69,630 
salary ceiling then in effect at the Corporation was
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inequitable because each of the six positions at this 
level had different job difficulty scores. Since the 
Corporation's mission is project oriented, the in­
dustrial sector was used as a guide to SFC salary 
policy. Hay Associates concluded that the Federal 
General Schedule is not adequate for the SFC because 
of the senior level salary compression. Roe Moe, a 
government corporation expert with the Congressional 
Research Service, has expressed direct disagreement,
"A convincing case should be made before authority 
is granted for salaries above Executive Level I of 
the Federal (S)chedule. In most instances, corpo­
ration executives should be included in the Senior
20Executive Service."
The consultants and SFC supporters suggest 
this salary compression can result in problems at­
tracting and retaining experienced private sector 
personnel:
"The criticality of the Corporation's 
mission would appear to warrant the 
recruitment from various parts of 
the private sector, especially the 
industrial sector, of talented and 
experienced individuals, many of 
whom will already be employed with 
competitively paying corporations."21
The Hay Report also noted that short-lived organi* 
zations with no career futures, like the SFC, usually 
need more attractive compensation and benefits packages
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to get quality employees and keep them.
Based primarily on the Hay report, the SFC Board 
approved a new compensation structure in February 1982. 
For the most part, compensation levels were to remain 
below Federal GS limits. While the TPF&C study failed 
to address comparisons with the General Schedule, Hay 
Associates (due to political pressure) made a special 
point of considering it in determining SFC compensation 
levels. However, the Hay report's recommended compen­
sation levels were only slightly less than those in the 
TPF&C report. Therefore, on a final note, the lower 
compensation levels set by President Reagan's Board 
were probably more a reflection of congressional and 
executive pressures than any substantive differences 
in the studies' results.
Now that some of the early events of the Corpora­
tion's compensation history have been reviewed, it's im­
portant to turn the provisions in the Energy Security 
Act (ESA), comparisons with other public corporations, 
and the nature of the SFC, generally. First of all, it 
should be recognized that Section 117 of the ESA gives 
the Corporation's Board the sole power to establish the 
compensation for each individual officer. In 1980, a 
significant reason why Congress created the SFC in the 
corporate form was to attract top talent. Therefore, 
the Board was given independent authority to set pay
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levels in excess of Federal salary scales, and r.- 
establish a benefits program, including life insurance, 
health insurance, disability, and a retirement plan (which 
is fully vested after one year of employment). Overall, 
Congress freed the Corporation from Federal Civil Service 
restrictions. Consequently, none of the SFC staff are 
GS employees. Such lenient directives in the ESA are 
significant points in view of the fact that continuous 
Congressional criticism has surrounded SFC personnel 
issues.
Although the Act does direct that the Federal Govern­
ment's Executive and General Schedules should be taken 
into account for comparable positions, the Board does 
have the authority to set salaries over the Executive 
Level I. If the President does not disapprove within 
3 0 days, the salary rates become effective. As a check on 
the Corporation's non-officer employee salaries. Congress 
simply required that the SFC identify, in its annual
report, those employees who are receiving more than $2,500
22 . . per month or $30,000 per year. In many ways, it is
evident the law was written by a very different Congress
during a very different Administration from those currently
in office.
In comparing the SFC compensation package with other 
quasigovernmental organizations, the Hay Associates report 
should again be referenced. In the report, the salaries 
of six organizations were compared. Each organization 
operates, to a varying degree, as a private sector entity
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in a public sector environment. "The similarity warrants
the analysis, even though the Congress has correctly
noted the differences between the SFC and other quasi-
23governmental corporations." Amtrack, COMSAT, Conrail, 
Federal National Mortgage Association, the Student Loan 
Marketing Association, and the Legal Services Corporation 
were compared. Each was created in whole or in part by 
the Federal Government; each has received public funds; 
and each has faced the need to attract and retain highly 
qualified personnel. Originally, Hay Associates had found 
that while many of the lower level SFC positions were 
perhaps over compensated, the higher level management 
and policy positions were obviously under compensated.
The upward shift in upper management salaries implemented 
as a result of the Hay recommendations, has made SFC 
officer compensation comparable to some executives in other 
quasi-governmental organizations.
However, since the SFC has been so heavily criticized 
regarding its compensation and benefits package, it 
has often pointed to other quasi-governmental organizations, 
stating the SFC should be given the same compensation 
freedoms. At one point, even Ed Noble, billionaire 
Oklahoma oil man, long time Reagan loyalist and SFC Chair­
man, tried to deflect such criticisms by accepting only 
$1 in annual pay from the Corporation. Somehow, though, 
the 'point' of this never received the hoped for public­
ity. So the SFC pointed to the COMSAT Chairman who receives 
a whopping $307,000 annual salary and the Conrail Chairman who
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receives $265,000 a year.^^ Of course, there are im­
portant differences between the SFC and these public 
corporations. In its 1981 report, the House Environment, 
Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee claims that 
"Congress knowingly created a very different entity in 
the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, and no comparisons 
between COMSAT and Conrail can stand.
While keeping in mind that this report was very neg­
ative and politically motivated, it is true that both 
the latter organizations are for-profit with non-public 
directors and stockholders. They receive much of their 
income from non-governmental sources, pay taxes, and are 
not subject to the Sunshine and Freedom of Information 
Acts, But to state, "no comparisons between COMSAT and 
Conrail (and the SFC) can stand" is an absolute and, 
therefore, indefensible statement. Especially, in regard 
to Conrail, which received Federal operating funds as 
late as 1981 —  five years after operations began. Not 
only does the Federal Government own 85% of Conrail's 
stock, but at one point, Conrail was losing $1 million 
per day and was being heavily subsidized by public monies.
In fact, the Federal Government has pumped billions into 
2Conrail. Therefore, it seems the Subcommittee dis­
played a short memory span while preparing this report.
By comparison, the SFC*s FY'83 operation cost a 
little less than $15 million. While the Corporation is 
allowed to spend $35 million a year for administrative
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expenses, such expenditures totalled only $14,754,436 
in fiscal year 198 3 (see Appendix III). Personnel costs 
for that year totalled $8,934,469.^^ Thus, the Corpo­
ration's policy of trying to rely on a small cadre of 
highly qualified professionals seems to be saving millions 
of dollars. Moreover, current staffing is being further 
cut by the process of attrition. Which brings us back 
to a central point— is it not warranted for the SFC to 
competitively compensate highly skilled employees, espe­
cially given the temporary nature of the organization?
The SFC cannot hire young engineers and train them for the 
ten to twenty years it takes to reach the top of their 
professions. Necessary personnel must have a depth of 
knowledge in areas like shale oil recovery and environ­
mental technology. A minimum of ten years experience,
demonstrating analytical and discretionary skills is a
2 8must ! Without competitive salaries, recruiting such 
candidates from the private sector can be difficult at 
best.
The temporary nature of the Corporation undoubtedly 
hinders the recruitment of high caliber candidates. The 
total compensation package of the SFC was geared toward 
short-term employees who have presumably forfeited bene­
fits accumulated after, perhaps, many years of service in 
the private sector. In order to fairly evaluate this 
"generous" package, it is essential to understand it in 
the proper perspective. Indeed, these may be small costs
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for the government, if, in the long haul, synfuels 
development could assure greater national security.
Poor Enabling Legislation
The public administration profile of the SFC is 
quite unusual. First of all, in organizational terms, the 
status of the Corporation is ambiguous. The Energy 
Security Act states specifically that it is not an agency 
or instrumentality of the U.S. Government. Indeed, it 
is in no way a part of the executive branch. However, 
understanding this designation proves difficult given the 
nature of its mission, the close oversight by Congress, 
the receipt of appropriated funds, and the use of the 
Dept, of Treasury. Similarly, arguing clearly that the 
SFC is either more or less autonomous than other public 
corporations, is equally problematic. Although Congress 
exempted the SFC from most managerial controls, i.e., 0MB, 
Congress also encumbered the organization with 26 pro­
visions for the legislative veto. Moreover, the ESA is 
72 pages long, extremely detailed, and includes signifi­
cant Congressional intervention in both broad and specific 
policy making.
Since the SFC is not an agency of the U.S., none of 
the government-wide laws apply to the organization unless 
the ESA specifically states that they apply. "No Federal 
law shall apply to the corporation as if it were an agency 
or instrumentality of the United States, except as
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expressly provided in this part."^^ This being the case, 
there are numerous unusual provisions of law made appli­
cable to the Corporation.
Among the government-wide statutes the SFC is not 
subjected to are procurement, Freedom of Information, 
Sunshine in the Government, privacy, and administrative 
procedures. However, the Act provides for variations 
on several of these laws specifically applicable to Syn­
fuels. First of all, there is an "open meeting" clause 
for Board meetings, followed by methods in which the 
Board may close the meeting. The financial disclosure 
provisions of the ethics in Government Act of 1978 are 
applicable to officers and employees of the SFC "as if 
it were a Federal a g e n c y . A l s o ,  much of the Freedom 
of Information and Privacy Acts are integrated into the ESA, 
The Davis-Bacon Act applies to the SFC and its clients 
with respect to payment of wages to clerical and laborer 
employees. But interestingly, the SFC is not subject to 
the Government Corporation Control Act of 194 5, discussed 
in Chapter One.
In summation, the ESA is a complex maze of grants 
and restrictions of authority applicable to this one 
Corporation. Indeed, the SFC's poor and awkward enabling 
legislation has often been cited as being at the core of 
much of the Corporation's problems. In practical terms, 
it is impossible for the Corporation to create any 
illusion of political or administrative accountability.
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It's legislation tends to run counter to such princi­
ples. Since the SFC is technically not an agency of the 
government, 0MB has no managerial rules it can legally 
enforce on the Corporation. Rather, 0MB is left with 
only the ability to expend political resources on the 
Corporation, which has created a frustrated situation 
at best. This holds true especially in light of the fact 
that 0MB's current Director has never supported the doc­
trine behind the SFC's mission, and would just as soon 
slash the program entirely in his deficit-cutting efforts 
Such attitudes are undoubtedly further aggravated by the 
reality that 0MB does not have authority to review the 
SFC's annual administrative budget. Thus, the relation­
ship between the two organizations has been intermittent 
and generally strained. Currently, this environment is 
evident in the evaluation of the Great Plains Project 
of which 0MB is a part. Obstensibly, the 0MB has 
become involved in SFC affairs because it is acting for 
the President in fulfilling his responsibilities under 
the Act.
Questions of Autonomy Versus Oversight
Institutionally, a difficult situation has emerged 
in assuring the accountability of the Corporation. Since 
0MB is not allowed administrative control of the organi­
zation, Congress is left to fill the void. This has 
meant holding numerous hearings, and issuing highly
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critical reports regarding the Corporation. While 
such Congressional tools are normally effective methods 
of conducting political oversight, they are cumbersome 
methods for administrative management.
According to the findings of the "Report on Govern­
ment Corporations" cited in Chapter One, effective account­
ability to Congress or an oversight agency cannot be 
realized in administrative detail, but should concentrate 
only on policy issues. "It is foolish for Department of 
Transportation officials to question the price of Amtrak 
beer and soft drinks, but appropriate for them to consider 
the corporation's total operating subsidy, the need for 
individual routes, or the reasonableness of such major
32costs as labor, capital equipment, and track maintenance." 
Such an example is reminiscent of SFC Congressional 
oversight.
Although the SFC does not have an oversight agency, the 
ESA does seem to encourage institutional relationships 
between the Corporation and Federal agencies. The most 
noteworthy of such relationships continues to be the 
Department of Treasury. The two organizations remain in 
close contact with respect to the Corporation's borrowing 
authority. The SFC draws monies by issuing a noninterest- 
bearing note payable to the U.S. Treasury, and due Septemb­
er 30, 1997 or upon termination of the Corporation, which­
ever date comes sooner. From the budgetary perspective, 
technically the SFC is a corporation both on-and off- budget
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—  another factor leading to political complications. 
While the receipts and disbursements of the SFC are 
presented annually in the Budget of the U.S. Government, 
such expenditures are not included in Budget totals.
Placing SFC transactions off-budget was undoubtedly 
done so legislators could disguise the huge outlays to 
be allocated to the program. Simultaneously, however, 
the SFC must present to Congress an annual business-like 
budget for administrative expenditures, which is subject 
to the Congressional appropriations process. While most 
public corporations must present an annual business-like 
budget (as required by the Government Corporation Control 
Act), not all are subject to the Congressional appropri­
ations process, an obvious method of oversight. This is 
usually a significant difference between government 
corporations and agencies.
As the SFC requires funds to make payments to pri­
vate firms, the monies will be issued from the Energy 
Security Reserve, mentioned earlier in this chapter.
This is also an on-budget account administered by 
Treasury. But only after the funds are provided from 
the Treasury, will the outlays be recorded in the Federal 
budget. In other words, SFC appropriations are on- 
budget, while SFC transactions are off-budget. Beyond 
these functions, the ESA further describes what the role 
between the SFC and the Treasury should be: "(t)he
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Corporation, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, shall insure to the maximum extent feasible
that the timing, interest rate, and substantial terms
and conditions of any financial assistance will have the
minimum possible impact on the capital markets of the
United States, taking into account Federal activities
which directly or indirectly influence such capital 
33markets." In drafting the ESA, Congress was obvious­
ly sensitive to the potential economic repercussions of 
such huge outlays.
Although the Act clearly addresses this relationship 
between Treasury and the SFC, it clearly does not address 
any relationship between the Department of Energy (DOE) 
and the SFC. Perhaps, this is due to the politically un­
favorable climate surrounding DOE during the drafting of 
the legislation. Whatever the reason, SFC critics have 
often suggested that the program would have been better 
guided if DOE had either been appointed the oversight 
agency, or if, simply, the SFC's program had been given 
to DOE. Of course, SFC supporters argue, for reasons 
already addressed elsewhere, why such an arrangement would 
have been or would be disasterous to the commercial 
nature of the synfuels program. But the point to be made 
here is the strong statutory autonomy that this legis­
lative omittal places on the SFC. Moreover, it is signi­
ficant that such omittal further positions the Corporation 
in a strong stance even with the Chief Executive,
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especially in the event of policy conflicts. However, 
for all the theoretical benefits of a public corporation 
having much autonomy, the political realities in Washing­
ton are such that ultimate survival is often difficult.
If the organization is small, like the SFC, not having 
an oversight agency can seriously place the program in 
the undesirable position of being all alone. Big is 
'beautiful' in Washington. Alone, without an obvious 
constituency, a program easily falls prey to the wolves.
An example of an also expensive, but politically shelter­
ed program is Amtrak, which has DOT as its direct over­
sight agency.
As is the case with essentially all public corporat­
ions, the SFC is subject to audit by the General Account­
ing Office (GAO). However, because the SFC is not covered 
by the Government Corporation Control Act, its auditing 
requirements are considered more stringent than those 
required of other government corporations covered by the 
Act. Furthermore, the Synfuels Corporation is required 
by the ESA to retain a firm of nationally reputed public 
accountants to prepare "in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles" a report which includes 
an audit of the Corporation's accounts "including state­
ments of the type required in Section 106 of the Govern­
ment Corporation Control Act."^ In practical terms, 
however, the authority of GAO to audit the SFC seemingly 
does not end here. For the past two years, GAO staff
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have been permanently housed within the premises of the 
SFC headquarters. Their auditing responsibilities 
have extended to include the financial evaluation of 
the Great Plains Project, currently undergoing negoti­
ations between the sponsors and the SFC. Such evolved 
circumstances undoubtedly are further evidence of the 
tremendous oversight of the SFC. Although such controls 
were not initiated legislatively, they have emerged 
loosely through the presumption that the Corporation or 
its management are not responsible, and thus, need con­
stant review.
Moreover, on a final note regarding oversight, the 
SFC is the only public corporation that has been required 
by law to house an inspector General (IG). Consequently, 
the SFC is subject to many types of internal audits and 
investigations. Creation of the IG has undoubtedly 
caused confusion as to where authority really lies. 
Existence of such an office does not guarantee that re­
ports of misconduct will be brought there. If anything, 
this office may only encourage suspicions of wrongdoing. 
Observers generally agree that an IG can often aid 
intra-organization destruction.
In conclusion, for all its intentions for creating 
a business-like, autonomous public corporation. Congress 
was only successful at assuring many methods of over­
sight of the SFC. Congress may have exempted the SFC 
from the benign Government Corporation Control Act,
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but in its place found numerous provisions for control, 
i.e.,personnel ceilings, vast Congressional oversight, 
creation of an IG, to name but a few. The very fact 
that the SFC was omitted from the Government Corporation 
Control Act, may have made the organization more vul­
nerable to be subject to numerous other laws and re­
straints. Of course, as noted above, many of these 
oversight measures were not legislated, but have evolved 
through time and politics. Dwight Ink, long-time 
Washington bureaucrat and former V.P. Administration at 
Synfuels, has noted that 40% of his time at the Corpo­
ration was spent in reacting to the GAO, the IG's Office, 
the press or the p u b l i c . M u c h  supposed policy autonomy 
becomes mute when such consequences of operating in a 
public setting are weighed in.
Although a public corporation undoubtedly must have 
some oversight to remain accountable, it is essential 
that such a body be left to function flexibly in its 
business environment. There are numerous public corpo­
rations where this balance has been more successfully 
achieved than at Synfuels. The presumed abuse by earlier 
Synfuels management initiated precedents that are im­
possible to reverse. The current Board of Reagan appoin­
tees have fallen victim to such politics. Each Board 
Meeting, they continually play to the media versus gett­




It is noteworthy that in the original proposal for
the Energy Security Corporation (which became the SFC)
"the role of Congress in overseeing the Corporation
is not discussed...except to note that the Corporation
will report to the President and the Congress on its
financial operations on an annual basis or more fre-
37quently, if necessary." The proposal states that it 
will not be necessary to seek annual appropriations 
since the authority will be provided at the time of the 
organization's creation. Essentially, this provision 
encourages little contact between the management of the 
Corporation and the relevant Congressional Committees.
So again, the ambiguities surrounding the organi­
zational status and authorities of the Corporation con­
tained obvious problems from the start, especially with 
regard to its relations with Congress. As noted earlier, 
such inherent problems are undoubtedly due in part to 
poor enabling legislation. From the beginning, the legis­
lation managed to leave many questions unanswered : "Who,
for example, will have the authority to submit amend­
ments to the law...? Would amendments have to be approved 
by the 0MB, as in the case with regular executive branch 
agencies and most government corporations? Or, can the 
board submit its own proposals, even if they are at 
variance with the wishes of the president?... (W)ill
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Congress be able to effect a 'legistative veto' over 
projects?"^®
Indeed, the original intention of the synfuels pro­
posed legislation was to allow it to function with a 
minimum amount of Congressional oversight. This was 
obviously drafted by a Congress which was trying to 
appeal to presidential desires at the time. However, 
since the political climate is now very differenct in 
both branches of government, this element of the law 
has particularly frustrated Congress which continues to 
react through disjointed efforts in its frantic attempts 
to control the Corporation, Consequently, the SFC is 
stymied from moving forward with its business. Thus, 
the enabling legislation has proved problematic from 
all perspectives.
Shortly after the Corporation's inception, and fol­
lowing President Reagan's landslide victory in 1980, the 
new Congress began scrutinizing the SFC. This has set 
the tone up to the present —  the political timing has 
always been off for the Corporation. Congress has con­
tinually delivered a negative message regarding the SFC, 
whether related to Board Members and management, personnel 
policies, or project funding. Obstensibly, Congressional 
arguments have always been lack of accountability and 
bad economics, but it is clear that simple ideological 
differences have also played a major role in diminishing 
the SFC.
87
Along these lines, however, little substantive 
action was taken by Congress the first couple of years. 
But as the 1984 election approached and deficit-cutting 
pressures multiplied, the Congress and the White House 
finally compromised on a 5.2 billion cut from synfuels 
obligational authority. Previously, 2 billion had been 
cut from the $17 billion Energy Reserve Account, which 
was given to social programs. This final compromise 
was the result of munerous proposals over the previous 
year, deriving mostly from the House, to reduce the bud­
get authority of the SFC. Of particular interest among 
these proposals was Representative Tom Corcoran's 
(R-IL) proposed bill to reduce the Corporation's loan 
authority to $3 billion. (As the top-ranking Republican 
on the House subcommittee that has jurisdiction over 
synfuels, in 1982, he also introduced legislation that 
would have totally abolished the Corporation). His 
proposed legislation would have also limited the SFC 
to research and development, a very tired solution.
Although the measure acquired eleven co-sponsors, it,
39apparently, never went beyond committee hearings.
But the significance of this proposal is its author, who 
a little over a year later was appointed to the SFC 
Board by the Reagan Administration. Corcoran has since 
positioned himself as Vice Chairman of the SFC Board, 
a new, fully-salaried position which is present in the 
daily operations of the Corporation. Observers note that
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following his lost bi: for the Senate, this position 
simply will provide him with a Washington base while 
giving him high visibility in Illinois since he obvi­
ously plans to run for the Senate again.
As noted, in 1984, the Corporation's Board had lacked 
a quorum since April, so in August, the Senate acted on a 
compromise proposal with the White House. {Administration 
officials had insisted since May that they would not re­
store a Board quorum until Congress substantially reduced 
the SFC's funding). Finally, the Administration agreed to 
present a list of Board nominees in exchange for immediate 
cuts of $5.2 billion. As noted earlier in this chapter, 
this is an unfortunate example of how the Corporation's 
Board and its operations were held hostage over the 
Administration's political maneuverings.
However, in November, just prior to a Congressional 
recess, the Senate and the White House still had not 
agreed on the list of nominees. In particular Corcoran's 
nomination was at issue in the Senate. Furthermore, al­
though Corcoran and the two other names (Paul MacAvoy and 
Eric Reichl) were submitted for nomination in October, 
they came too late for the Senate to complete the confir­
mation process before adjournment. So the President, 
using his powers of office, gave "recess appointments 
to the three nominees, which would enable them to serve 
until the end of 1985 without being confirmed. But a 
six-month legislative battle over SFC funding and Board
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nominations had been laid to rest, at least tempo­
rarily.
In summation, it must be concluded from Corcoran's 
appointment that more than mere irony was at work here. 
Last year, the Administration initially had proposed 
to cut the SFC by $9.5 billion. Since the White House 
was forced to compromise, particularly with the Senate, 
by settling for a lesser cut, Corcoran's appointment was 
undoubtedly a measure at the Administration's disposal 
to further diminish the program. Many observers, in­
cluding SFC Chairman Edward Noble, questioned whether 
the White House might have had other ulterior motives 
than that of giving the Board the necessary quorum to 
take action on pending synfuel projects.
Moreover, as an aside note, it is interesting that 
for all the legislative energy put forth last year by 
both Congress and the Administration, the 1984 Republi­
can Party platform was totally silent on Synfuel Corpo­
ration cuts, and synfuels development in general.
"Indeed, the party's entire plank on energy policy con­
sists of only six sfiort paragraphs, which primarily 
praises the Administration's decontrolling of oil 
prices.
Meanwhile, Mr. Corcoran, now the SFC Vice Chairman, 
has ceased to push for abolition of the Corporation. 
Rather, he now argues that it "would be a serious mistake 
to abolish the S F C . A n d ,  in reference to DOE's
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program for research and development that operated before 
creation of the SFC, the Vice Chairman remarks, "spent 
billions with nothing p r o d u c e d . I n d e e d ,  Corcoran 
now maintains that the Corporation is essential; partic­
ularly, he argues since the production goals of 
500,000 barrels per day by 1987 and 2 million barrels 
per day by 19 90 were eliminated in the legislation 
approved last year. Amazingly, one of the SFC’s great­
est political foes, has now become a political ally of 
the newly scaled-down program.
In current Congressional relations, the Vice Chair­
man has played his new role with zeal. The most obvious 
of anti-synfuels legislation now being proposed is an 
SFC-abolition amendment to be attached to the House's 
fiscal year 1986 budget resolution. Congressmen John 
Dingell (D-MI) Chairman of the House Energy Committee 
and Mike Synar (D-OK) propose to abolish the Corporation 
and transfer $500 million of its funding to DOE. Power­
ful support for this amendment is currently massing in 
the House. But Corcoran has recently opposed such a 
proposal, maintaing that without the Corporation, the 
Federal government’s synthetic fuels effort would revert 
to "Pork-barrel p o l i t i c s . M o r e o v e r ,  the Vice Chair­
man justifies his new attitude toward the SFC by arguing 
to Congress that its requested mission will be accom­
plished using "significantly less"^^ than the currently
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available $8 billion. He further assures Congress 
that the program will not request the additional $68 
billion authorized for the originally proposed second 
phase of synfuels development.
Should the Synfuels Corporation be Saved?
There are undoubtedly numerous reasons why the U.S.
Synfuels program should be saved. But, of course, the
obvious reason of many synfuels proponents is national
security. "There is today only a nine-year supply of
45oil in the United States." According to James
Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy in the Carter
Administration, "This country vacillates between panic
and complacency. We're in a complacency period right
46now and that is going to induce another panic."
Indeed, it is hard to imagine energy shortages and
gas lines. However, although OPEC has been partially
replaced by other importers, and U.S. oil consumption
of imported oil is only 30 percent today versus 4 7
percent in 1977,^^ imports did rise last year by 6.5
percent for the first time since 1979. When demand
was falling, the chronic problem of U.S. production not
meeting demand, was only masked. Moreover, gasoline
imports are rising even faster than imports of crude oil,
48jumping by 30 percent last year alone.
Evidence pointing to the growth of U.S. dependence 
on oil and gas imports abound, and obviously exceed far
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beyond the necessary realm for discussion here. Rather, 
what is at issue is the continued necessity for develop­
ment of alternative fuels— and possibly even at the 
expense of encouraging uneconomic projects. In the long 
run, the experience gained from such "economic failures" 
may well pay for themselves again and again. This argu­
ment has undoubtedly held true for many infant industries 
around the world and through time. Furthermore, con­
tinued U.S. investment in and greater reliance on alter­
native energy sources surely will free this country from 
the many foreign policy constraints that make our national 
security so vulnerable. Such investment would seem pre­
ferable to further military build-up, though not as 
politically expediate, perhaps. In summary, Daniel 
Yergin, President of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 
has remarked, "A lot of progress has been made. But 
after what we've been through, it would be foolish (to
49ignore) recurrent questions about energy security."
Congress and the Corporation itself have already 
taken significant steps toward minimizing the scale of 
the synfuels program. Of course, opponents of the SFC 
hope to take this measure one step further, and enve­
lope what remains of the organization within DOE's 
structure. Such a final solution seems drastic and 
certainly unnecessary. Proponents of the program could 
argue that as long as financial assistance is being
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awarded in the commercial sector, the program should 
remain in the corporate form. After all, attacks on 
the SFC have not necessarily been a fault of the corpo­
rate form. More accurately, the SFC's poor enabling 
legislation may be blamed for political confusion, and 
therefore, controversy and criticism.
Attacks on the SFC also reflect deep divisions 
througlTOut the country on the role of government in the 
development of alternative fuels. Thus, it is likely 
that a synfuels program packaged in any form would have 
drawn the same critical scrutiny. Indeed, considering 
the potential advantages that can be realized through 
the use of the public corporation, the issue here may 
well be how to assure that the next synfuels corporation 
be saved from a similar fate. The previously addressed 
arguments for establishing public corporations may be 
especially poignant when the government wishes to en­
courage a new industry commercially. Public corporations 
should,in theory, be an ideal median for creating a new 
public function immediately, and generally, they are 
easier to dismantle than the entrenced bureaucracies that 
come from creating core agencies.
Therefore, the organizational form may be relative 
at most to the travails of the SFC. Having said that, 
however, most observers would agree that had the synfuels 
program been buried within a bureau of DOE, for example, 
it is unlikely it would have attracted so much unwanted
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attention. But given the importance ot its mission to 
the country, the Corporation's project orientation, the 
experienced personnel required, and the short time 
frame given to reach its goals, such an organizational 
form was certainly needed and can be justified.
The Corporation's Future
From May until October of 1984, while Congress 
debated its future, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation was 
essentially an organization without a future. Finally, 
the situation became clear: $5 billion would be cut
from the SFC, leaving only $8 billion. These cuts 
meant that the latest projects could not be funded. 
Earlier eligible projects would use up all of the re­
maining $8 billion. So throughout the summer and early 
fall of 1984, the SFC personnel had simply been going 
through the motions —  wasting their time on projects 
that would never be funded.
Unfortunately, this wasted effort was only a part of 
a continuous chain of attacks on employee morale. Earli­
er in the Corporation's history, SFC staff felt they were 
"on a mission" to help develop a national alternative 
fuels industry. There was a true 'esprit de corp,' 
and much pride taken in working long hours, all of which 
this author was a part. But falling oil prices, abuse 
from the Administration, attacks in the press. Congress­
ional politicking, lack of private sector support, and
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working without seeing any tangible results have caused 
many private-sector oriented staff to leave in droves.
Recently, this tragic phenomenon alone has the Cor­
poration undergoing rapid evolution. Moreover, the 
SFC "becomes more and more crippled with each passing 
week as its Congressional opponents prepare to move in 
for the final kill."^^ Indeed, many Washington observers 
claim the Corporation is being deliberately ushered into 
such a position of inoperation so that abolition will be 
just a formality.
Until recently, the future of the organization was 
not quite so gloomy. Some staff even predicted that 
current projects would be funded over the next year: 
then a reduced organization would go into the monitoring 
phase under the wing of an oversight agency, perhaps.
But increasingly budget reductions are the overriding 
Congressional concern; even though killing the Corpo­
ration would not produce anything like an $8 billion 
reduction in the 1986 b u d g e t . H o w e v e r ,  warnings that 
the drive to kill the SFC should be taken seriously, are 
now coming even from the Senate. While Congressional 
opposition has generally come from the House, these 
warnings recently came from the majority side on the 
Senate Energy Committee. But as recently as early May, 
the top-ranking Democrat of that Committee, J. Bennett 
Johnston (D-LA) stated, "You're our baby. Takes two
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Houses to change anything. The only other committee
where changes could take place is Appropriations, and
52you'll see the same faces there."
It's anybody's guess where all this will leave 
Vice Chairman Corcoran's new scaled-down program. Cor­
poration opponents tend to think his reform movement will 
be trampled by the efforts to complete the SFC's 
business before the ax falls.
Considering all of the above, and the very real 
possibilities of future oil shocks, how can Congress im­
prove the mechanisms for the next SFC? And, can the 
next SFC carry out its responsibilities without experi­
encing the same kinds of demoralizing attacks? Until 
the country reaches a concensus on a national energy 
policy the answer has to be "no."
Perhaps after the next oil shock. Congress can 
establish a COMSAT for energy. A completely private 
corporation could build and sell (or operate) synthetic 
fuel plants, with the idea that it is a 'for profit' 
corporation. Whatever type of corporation emerges from 
the next oil shock, it must be left alone to carry out 
its responsibilities. It is ironic that just as the 
SFC had seemed to establish an effective and responsible 
program, a variety of forces worked to negate it.
CHAPTER THREE; FOOTNOTES
^This number includes non-exempt or support level staff 
and represents total SFC staffing at mid-year 1984. in 
comparison to original Congressional intention, this figure 
represents gross under staffing by a politically insecure 
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eral regulatory 
powers of Board 
of Governors of 
Federal Reserve 
System












































of national and 
international 
agencies, and 






may accept funds 
from any Latin 
American 
Government
Subject to GAO 
audit and audit 
by Independent 
CPAs
No stock 22 USC 478
Howard Private 31 members of
University nonprofit Board of Trustees
all nonpublic ; 25 
perpetual members,
2 elected graduates, 
2 elected students, 



































15 members; 3 ap­
pointed by the 
President with 
Senate confirma­
tion and 12 
members elected 
by holders of 
Class B and 
Class C stock
15 members; 12 
elected by stock­
holders and 3 






















bodies, and other 
public or private 
Investors




audit by the FCA 
and GAO
Borrowers 
of the Bank 
and
Government










*Classlfled as predominately private because P.L. 97-35 provided the conversion of the bank to a private 








National Park Charitable Up to 23 members;
Foundation nonprofit Secretary of
corporation Interior (Chair­
man) , Director 
of National Park 
Service (Sec­





































































21 members; 14 
elected by stock­
holders and 
7 appointed by 
the President
Authority to 
borrow from the 
FFB; can Issue 
debt obligations 
with approval of 
Secretary of 
Education and 
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Comparison of On-Budget and Off-Budget Financing 

































Authority Receipts Obligations Outlays

















$1.372.2 $1.369.5 $32.852.5 $40.658.8 $64.620.6 $23.049.6
—^Authority to borrow— currently funded through the FFB. The Corporation actually borrowed $1,955 million from the 
FFB in 1981.
—^Payments for the purchase of U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation's notes are shown as Treasury Department outlays.
—^Contract authority.
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SFC ADMINISTRmVE EXPENSES 
HISTORY OF AUTHORIZATION USE
( $ 0 0 0 . ( X X @
FY 0 0  ESTIMATE
FV 05  ESTIMATE
FY 04  ACTUAL
FY 0 0  ACTUAL
FY 0 2  ACTUAL
FY 01 ACTUAL
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FY # 0  ACTUAL
W
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Ü1
E ]  Authorized Admin. Exp.
CZ3 Used Admin. Exp.
□  Authorized Generic Studies 
O  Used Generic Studies
